Index:
|
About
This reference file is an inventory and critical analysis of the claims made
about the weapons and programmes that Iraq is proscribed from having under the
terms of Security Council Resolutions 687 (1991), paragraphs. 10 and 12: that
is, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as ballistic missiles with
a range greater than 150km.
It is not about Iraq's overall compliance with that resolution or subsequent
resolutions on Iraq, including SCR 1441 (2002). For example, it does not attempt
to analyse the extent of Iraq's obstruction of inspectors from UNSCOM, UNMOVIC
or IAEA. It is instead a presentation of what is actually known about the weapons
and programmes themselves. For the UN inspectors currently in Iraq, discovering
what is unknown about the history and present status of these items is the task
at hand. Inspectors must engage with the possibility of Iraq's retention
or development of non-conventional weapons, and report to the Security Council
on this basis. However, a set of evaluations can also be made of the likelihood
of Iraq's non-conventional weapons programmes, given the material available.
No overall judgements are made in this reference file, but material is presented
that should allow a more well informed opinion to be reached.
The author of this reference file is Dr Glen Rangwala, an independent analyst at the University of Cambridge, UK. If any of the technical claims made below are incorrect or incomplete, such mistakes have not been made in a deliberate attempt to mislead the reader: corrections and clarifications would be greatly appreciated. Contact details are at the end of this page.
Main sources
The claims examined here about Iraq's weapons and weapons programmes are taken
largely from reports of branches of the US and UK governments. The following
sources have been used most extensively:
The evaluation of these claims is made using a broader variety of sources. These include:
State Department, 12 September 2002, p.9: "A new report released on September 9, 2002 from the International Institute for Strategic Studies - an independent research organization - concludes that Saddam Hussein could build a nuclear bomb within months if he were able to obtain fissile material."
CIA, October 2002, p.1: "If Baghdad acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile material from abroad, it could make a nuclear weapon within a year. Without such material from abroad, Iraq probably would not be able to make a weapon until the last half of the decade."
|
Evaluation. The key component of any fission bomb is the fissile material. According to the Nuclear Control Institute (nci.org/heu.htm), "With bomb-grade, high-enriched uranium (HEU), a student could make a bomb powerful enough to destroy a city". According to the Federation of American Scientists (p.61), "More than 90 percent of the entire Manhattan Project budget went to the production of fissile materials; less than 4 percent went to the weapon laboratory at Los Alamos." As a result, nuclear safeguards concentrate on preventing the transfer of plutonium-239 and highly enriched uranium (uranium containing 90% or more of uranium-235), and on enrichment technology. Once the fissile core has been obtained, a crude nuclear device can be assembled with a gun-like tube and high explosive; or alternatively with a series of detonators and high explosives shaped as lenses. None of these technological problems would pose a serious difficulty to a well-resourced scientist, working without international safeguards. Therefore, the claim that Iraq could rapidly develop a nuclear bomb if it managed to acquire fissile material seems to be accurate. It is also verging on being a tautology. However, the controls on fissile material and the presence of international inspectors inside Iraq render the possibility of Iraq's effective development of a nuclear device very low. Furthermore, there have been no claims that Iraq has actually attempted to import fissile material since 1991, and the known fissile material within Iraq prior to that date has been fully accounted for by the IAEA. Results of UN inspections: 45 days after the commencement of nuclear inspections, Time Magazine put the point to the IAEA's Director General, Mohamed ElBaradei: "The Bush Administration has repeatedly said Iraq is very close to owning a nuclear bomb." ElBaradei replied:
A summary of the IAEA's position was presented by ElBaradei to the Security Council on 7 March 2003:
|
State Department, 12 September 2002, p.10: "Iraq has withheld documentation relevant to its past nuclear program, including data about enrichment techniques, foreign procurement, weapons design, experimental data, and technical documents. Iraq still has [...] some of the infrastructure needed to pursue its goal of building a nuclear weapon."
|
Evaluation. The claim that Iraq has withheld documents, either by design or by neglect, seems to be plausible, but as the content of its dossier of December 2002 has not been made public available, it is not possible to assess this assertion. With regard to the claim that Iraq still has some of the infrastructure to build a nuclear weapon, a spokesperson of the IAEA said:
Results of UN inspections. Although confirming that the process of inspections was still in its early stages, the Director General of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei was quoted by Reuters on 18 December 2002 saying that: "No evidence has surfaced so far that facilities have been changed since 1998 ". He reaffirmed this view on 6 January 2003, when he said that United Nations weapons inspectors in Iraq had found nothing suspicious so far, and there was no evidence that Iraq had lied in its declarations on nuclear arms (quoted in the Financial Times, 7 January). ElBaradei was more forthright in his update to the Security Council on 27 January 2003 (paras.65 and 71):
|
Department of Defense, 8 October 2002, slide 25: claimed al-Qaim plant was "currently active".
|
Evaluation. The facilities of al-Qaim, Iraq's only uranium extraction facility based 400 km to the west of Baghdad and near the Syrian border, were destroyed in 1991. A number of journalists have since visited al-Qaim and have found it in a state of disrepair. Paul McGeough, the much-respected Middle East correspondent of the Sydney Morning Herald, wrote on 4 September 2002 that the site appeared to be a "near-vacant lot [...] as the result of a clean-up supervised by the [IAEA]". Reuters reporters have confirmed the same impression. Results of UN inspections. Inspectors from the IAEA visited al-Qaim on 10-11 December 2002, and reported on their on-going monitoring of the destroyed plant. A further inspection took place on 7 January 2003. |
President Bush, 7 October 2002: "Satellite photographs reveal that Iraq is rebuilding facilities at sites that have been part of its nuclear program in the past."
|
Evaluation. The satellite photos referred to by President Bush were published in the New York Times on 6 September 2002, and were cited at a press conference on 7 September 2002 with Tony Blair and George Bush. Mr Blair proclaimed that these commercial satellite photographs showed new buildings had been constructed at a former nuclear weapons site in Iraq, and that this showed that the "threat is real" of Iraq's continuing nuclear programmes. The location discussed was not identified by Blair and Bush, but is believed to be Tuweitha (the site called Osirak by its French constructors, 25 km southeast of Baghdad). The IAEA, to whom both leaders attributed the photos, put out a statement that "it has no new information on Iraq's nuclear programme since December 1998 when its inspectors left Iraq". Results of UN inspection. Tuweitha has been visited by inspectors from the IAEA repeatedly since November 2002, and no suspicious findings have been reported. The IAEA has reported on inspections of the Tuweitha site on 6 December 2002 and, more extensively, on 9 - 10 - 11 December 2002. After a further visit, on 20 December 2002, an IAEA / UNMOVIC joint press statement concluded that "the former Tuwaitha nuclear complex [..] now conducts civilian research in the non-nuclear field". Further radiation testing at the site has been conducted by the IAEA on 21 January 2003, and an aerial inspection took place on 31 January 2003. An inspection of previously inaccessible sites at the Tuweitha site was conducted on 15 February 2003. A more detailed description of Tuweitha was provided by Kim Sengupta in The Independent:
The IAEA inspection of the sites referred to by Tony Blair and George Bush was confirmed by the Director General of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, in his briefing to the Security Council on 9 January 2003:
This view was confirmed and enlarged upon by ElBaradei in his update to the Security Council on 27 January 2003 (para.35):
A more concise assessment was provided by ElBaradei to the Security Council on 7 March 2003:
|
UK dossier, 24 September 2002, p.21: "Iraq has built a large new chemical complex, Project Baiji, in the desert in north west Iraq at al-Sharqat. This site is a former uranium enrichment facility which was damaged during the Gulf War and rendered harmless under supervision of the IAEA. Part of the site has been rebuilt, with work starting in 1992, as a chemical production complex. Despite the site being far away from populated areas it is surrounded by a high wall with watch towers and guarded by armed guards. Intelligence reports indicate that it will produce nitric acid which can be used in explosives, missile fuel and in the purification of uranium."
This plant is highlighted also in Department of Defense, 8 October 2002.
Evaluation. According to an IAEA report of January 1994, al-Sharqat is the principle supplier of sulphuric and nitric acid to Iraqi industries. The UK dossier does not claim that the nitric acid produced at al-Sharqat is used in the production of illicit weapons, merely that nitric acid "can be used" in missile fuel and in purifying uranium. It later changed its name to al-Hadar State Company.
Results of UN inspection. al-Sharqat was inspected by an UNMOVIC chemical team on 2 January 2003, and by a joint IAEA-UNMOVIC team on 12 January 2003. The overall assessment of Iraq's facilities provided by the IAEA is recounted above, in the section on Iraq's facilities.
UK dossier, 24 September 2002, p.25: "there is intelligence that Iraq has sought the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa. Iraq has no active civil nuclear power programme or nuclear power plants and therefore has no legitimate reason to acquire uranium."
State Department, 19 December 2002: "The [Iraqi] Declaration ignores efforts to procure uranium from Niger. Why is the Iraqi regime hiding their uranium procurement?"
White House, January 2003, p.5: "The [Iraqi] Declaration ignores efforts to procure uranium from abroad."
Secretary
Powell, 26 January 2003: "Why is Iraq still trying to procure
uranium [...]?"
|
Evaluation. Iraq is indeed known to have sought to import significant quantities of uranium (yellowcake) from Niger; this was in 1981-82. The absence of any detail in the reports cited above - such as the year (or even the decade) in which this purported attempt to obtain uranium, and the quality of the uranium sought - may indicate that this is the incident referred to by the UK dossier and the State Department. According to a retired senior official who spoke to AFP, Niger cannot export uranium without the consent of its three partners, France, Japan and Spain. Niger's Prime Minister has stated that permission was not granted for uranium to be sold to Iraq (Voice of America, 27 December 2002). The Director General of the IAEA indicated in his briefing to the Security Council (9 January 2003, para.12) that he had not received "any specific information" from the States making these allegations. This point was expanded upon in an interview on 12 January 2003: "There were reports from different member states that [...] [the Iraqis] were importing uranium from Africa [...]. They deny they have imported any uranium since 1991. (From) the U.S., the U.K. and others— we need to get specifics of when and where. We need actionable information." On 7 March 2003, ElBaradei revealed to the Security Council that the allegations were centred around "documents provided by a number of States that pointed to an agreement between Niger and Iraq for the sale of uranium between 1999 and 2001." After reviewing the evidence extensively - including "correspondence coming from various bodies of the Government of Niger" - and "compar[ing] the form, format, contents and signatures of that correspondence with those of the alleged procurement-related documentation", ElBaradei gave his assessment of the reliability of this information:
ElBaradei concluded: "There is no indication that Iraq has attempted to import uranium since 1990." |
State Department, 12 September 2002, p.9: "Iraq has stepped up its quest for nuclear weapons and has embarked on a worldwide hunt for materials to make an atomic bomb. In the last 14 months, Iraq has sought to buy thousands of specially designed aluminum tubes which officials believe were intended as components of centrifuges to enrich uranium."
UK dossier, 24 September 2002, p.26: "Iraq has also made repeated attempts covertly to acquire a very large quantity (60,000 or more) of specialised aluminium tubes. The specialised aluminium in question is subject to international export controls because of its potential application in the construction of gas centrifuges used to enrich uranium, although there is no definitive intelligence that it is destined for a nuclear programme."
CIA, October 2002, pp.1-2: "Iraq's aggressive attempts to obtain proscribed high-strength aluminum tubes are of significant concern. All intelligence experts agree that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons and that these tubes could be used in a centrifuge enrichment program. Most intelligence specialists assess this to be the intended use, but some believe that these tubes are probably intended for conventional weapons programs. Based on tubes of the size Iraq is trying to acquire, a few tens of thousands of centrifuges would be capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium for a couple of weapons per year."
President Bush, 7 October 2002: "Iraq has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes and other equipment needed for gas centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons."
President Bush, 28 January 2003: "Our intelligence sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production. Saddam Hussein has not credibly explained these activities. He clearly has much to hide."
Secretary Powell, 5 February 2003: "[Saddam Hussein] has made repeated covert attempts to acquire high-specification aluminum tubes from 11 different countries, even after inspections resumed. These tubes are controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers Group precisely because they can be used as centrifuges for enriching uranium. [...] Most U.S. experts think they are intended to serve as rotors in centrifuges used to enrich uranium. [...] all the experts who have analyzed the tubes in our possession agree that they can be adapted for centrifuge use. [...] First, it strikes me as quite odd that these tubes are manufactured to a tolerance that far exceeds U.S. requirements for comparable rockets. [...] Second, we actually have examined tubes from several different batches that were seized clandestinely before they reached Baghdad. What we notice in these different batches is a progression to higher and higher levels of specification, including, in the latest batch, an anodized coating on extremely smooth inner and outer surfaces. Why would they continue refining the specifications, go to all that trouble for something that, if it was a rocket, would soon be blown into shrapnel when it went off?".
|
Evaluation. David Albright, former IAEA inspector and director of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), has argued that the aluminium tubes are more likely to be used in the making of conventional artillery rockets. According to an ISIS paper:
In its declaration to the UN on 7 December 2002, Iraq "provided information on a short-range rocket that is manufactured using 81 mm aluminium tubes", according to Hans Blix, Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, in his notes for briefing the Security Council of 19 December 2002. UNMOVIC has not yet been able to test the accuracy of this part of the declaration. Results of UN inspection. The view that the tubes are used for rockets was provisionally endorsed by the Director General of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, in his comments to the press on 9 January 2003:
This point was further elaborated upon in ElBaradei's briefing to the Security Council on the same day (paras.9-10; emphasis added): "the IAEA has conducted a series of inspections at sites involved in the production and storage of reverse engineered rockets, held discussions with and interviewed Iraqi personnel, taken samples of aluminium tubes, and begun a review of the documentation provided by Iraq relating to contracts with the traders. While the matter is still under investigation, and further verification is foreseen, the IAEA's analysis to date indicates that the specifications of the aluminium tubes sought by Iraq in 2001 and 2002 appear to be consistent with reverse engineering of rockets. While it would be possible to modify such tubes for the manufacture of centrifuges, they are not directly suitable for it." ElBaradei repeated these conclusions in an interview on 12 January 2003: "Our provisional conclusion is that these tubes were for rockets and not for centrifuges". This judgement was expanded upon in ElBaradei's update to the Security Council on 27 January 2003, para.52. An extensive review of the evidence is in the Washington Post, 24 January 2003. Further investigation included private interviews with Iraqi senior engineers on 13 February 2003 and 17 February 2003. In response to Secretary Powell's comments on the high level of specification of the aluminium tubes, ElBaradei told the Security Council on 14 February 2003 that:
ElBaradei's statement on 7 March 2003 provided a detailed reply to Secretary Powell's claims:
ElBaradei concluded: "There is no indication that Iraq has attempted to import aluminium tubes for use in centrifuge enrichment. Moreover, even had Iraq pursued such a plan, it would have encountered practical difficulties in manufacturing centrifuges out of the aluminium tubes in question." With regard to potential production of suitable aluminium tubes, ElBaradei added:
Ongoing monitoring is, however, necessary. |
UK dossier, 24 September 2002, p.24: "Since 1998 Iraq had been trying to procure items that could be for use in the construction of centrifuges for the enrichment of uranium."
UK dossier, 24 September 2002, p.26: "other important procurement
activity since 1998 has included attempts to purchase:
Secretary Powell, 26 January 2003: "Why is Iraq still trying to procure [...] the special equipment needed to transform [uranium] into material for nuclear weapons?"
Secretary Powell, 5 February 2003: "In 1999 and 2000, Iraqi officials negotiated with firms in Romania, India, Russia and Slovenia for the purchase of a magnet production plant. Iraq wanted the plant to produce magnets weighing 20 to 30 grams. That's the same weight as the magnets used in Iraq's gas centrifuge program before the Gulf War."
Secretary Powell, 5 February 2003: "Intercepted communications from mid-2000 through last summer showed that Iraq front companies sought to buy machines that can be used to balance gas centrifuge rotors. [...] there is no doubt in my mind. These illicit procurement efforts show that Saddam Hussein is very much focused on putting in place the key missing piece from his nuclear weapons program".
| Evaluation. It should be noted that the claim in the UK dossier
is not that the materials that Iraq has sought to import can only be used
as part of a nuclear weapons programme, but that these materials could
be used in such a programme. Conversely, it is quite conceivable that
these materials are not being used in a nuclear programme at all.
For example, the dossier notes that Iraq has attempted to purchase Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride (AHF) since 1998, and that AHF could be used in gas centrifuges for the enrichment of uranium (Chapter 3, para.21). However, AHF is also used as an alkylating agent in the petrochemical industry. For a country that has been made solely dependent upon its petrochemical exports for its foreign exchange, the import of AHF can hardly be a surprise or a cause for suspicion in itself. Results of UN inspection. The magnet production line referred to in the UK dossier and by Powell was discussed by ElBaradei in his update to the Security Council on 27 January 2003, paras.58-59:
That further investigation included an interview with an Iraqi magnet specialist formerly associated with the gas centrifuge programme on 21 February 2003. ElBaradei's statement on 7 March provided a detailed reply to Secretary Powell's claims:
With regard to the magnet production line that Iraq admits to having signed a contract for in June 2001, the IAEA concluded that "domestic magnet production seems reasonable from an economic point of view", but that any facilities produced need to be subject to continued inspections and monitoring. In response to the UK dossier's and Secretary Powell's claims about gas centrifuge rotors, ElBaradei told the Security Council on 14 February 2003 that:
Further investigation included private interviews with Iraqi senior engineers on 17 and 19 February 2003. |
State Department, 12 September 2002, p.10: "Iraq still has the technical expertise and some of the infrastructure needed to pursue its goal of building a nuclear weapon. Saddam Hussein has repeatedly met with his nuclear scientists over the past two years, signaling his continued interest in developing his nuclear program."
UK dossier, 24 September 2002, p.24: "The JIC drew attention to intelligence that Iraq had recalled its nuclear scientists to the programme in 1998."
CIA, October 2002, p.6: "Iraq retains its cadre of nuclear scientists and technicians . [...] Iraqi media have reported numerous meetings between Saddam and nuclear scientists over the past two years, signaling Baghdad's continued interest in reviving a nuclear program."
President Bush, 7 October 2002: "Before being barred from Iraq in 1998, the International Atomic Energy Agency dismantled extensive nuclear weapons-related facilities, including three uranium enrichment sites. That same year, information from a high-ranking Iraqi nuclear engineer who had defected revealed that despite his public promises, Saddam Hussein had ordered his nuclear program to continue. The evidence indicates that Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. Saddam Hussein has held numerous meetings with Iraqi nuclear scientists, a group he calls his 'nuclear mujahideen' -- his nuclear holy warriors."
Secretary Powell, 5 February 2003: "over the last 18 months Saddam Hussein has paid increasing personal attention to Iraqis' top nuclear scientists."
|
Evaluation. The last part of the excerpt from President Bush's speech of 7 October 2002 contains a misquote, and a mistranslation. The speech referred to was made on 10 September 2000 and was about, in part, nuclear energy. The transcription of the speech was made at the time by the BBC monitoring service. Saddam Hussein actually refers to "nuclear energy mujahidin", and doesn't mention the development of weaponry. In addition, the term "mujahidin" is often used in a non-combatant sense, to mean anyone who struggles for a cause. Saddam Hussein, for example, often refers to the mujahidin developing Iraq's medical facilities. There is nothing in the speech to indicate that Iraq is attempting to develop or threaten the use of nuclear weapons. Results of UN inspection. ElBaradei reviews in passing the evidence about personnel in his update to the Security Council on 27 January 2003, paras.22-23:
|
UK dossier, 24 September 2002, p.18: "In the first half of 2000 the JIC noted intelligence on Iraqi attempts to procure dual-use chemicals and on the reconstruction of civil chemical production at sites formerly associated with the chemical warfare programme."
(a) Existing chemical weapons
State Department, 12 September 2002, p.9: "Gaps identified by UNSCOM in Iraqi accounting and current production capabilities strongly suggest that Iraq maintains stockpiles of chemical agents, probably VX, sarin, cyclosarin and mustard."
Similarly: CIA, October 2002, p.10: "More than 10 years after the Gulf war, gaps in Iraqi accounting and current production capabilities strongly suggest that Iraq maintains a stockpile of chemical agents, probably VX, sarin, cyclosarin, and mustard. [...] Iraq probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons (MT) and possibly as much as 500 MT of CW agents."
UK dossier, 24 September 2002, p.18: "In mid-2001 the JIC assessed that Iraq retained some chemical warfare agents [...] and weapons from before the Gulf War."
Department of Defense, 8 October 2002: 200 metric tons of VX, 200 metric tons of G-Agents (sarin) and 200 metric tons of mustard are unaccounted for.
UK dossier, 24 September 2002, p.19: "Iraq has admitted to UNSCOM to having the knowledge and capability to add stabiliser to nerve agent and other chemical warfare agents which would prevent such decomposition. In 1997 UNSCOM also examined some munitions which had been filled with mustard gas prior to 1991 and found that they remained very toxic and showed little sign of deterioration."
Evaluation. It should also be noted that the UK and US have never claimed that Iraq continued to produce chemical or biological weapons in the period of UNSCOM inspections, between 1991 and 1998 (although they do claim that infrastructure and equipment for the production of non-conventional weapons was developed). As a result, a stockpile of existing weapons must consist of those produced prior to 1991, or after 1998. Any material produced after 1998 is discussed below, in the sections on production.
Up to 1998, a substantial part of the work of the weapons inspectors in Iraq was to track down chemical and biological agents that Iraq had produced before their entry in 1991, and to check the documentation that showed how much of each agent Iraq had manufactured. However, the amount Iraq is thought to have produced in the 1980s was found to be greater than the quantity that Iraq or the inspectors verified as having destroyed. The discrepancy between the two levels is the amount that remains - in the inspectors' language - "unaccounted for".
The levels of agents that are unaccounted for in this way is large, as many of the US and UK claims above rightly identify. But the fact that these quantities are unaccounted for does not mean that they still exist. Iraq has never provided a full declaration of its use of chemical weapons against Iran in the 1980-88 war, and it claims to have destroyed large quantities of its own stocks of these weapons in 1991 without keeping sufficient proof of its actions.
It may also be the case that Iraq had in fact produced more of these agents than they had declared to UNSCOM or that UNSCOM itself had uncovered. This possibility is mentioned in the excerpt below, from the CIA in October 2002.
In some cases, it is quite clear that any stocks that were retained no longer exist in usable form. Most chemical and biological agents are subject to processes of deterioration. A working paper by UNSCOM from January 1998 noted that: "Taking into consideration the conditions and the quality of CW-agents and munitions produced by Iraq at that time, there is no possibility of weapons remaining from the mid-1980's" (quoted in Arms Control Today, June 2000). As discussed below, mustard constitutes an exception to this general pattern.
If the allegations that Iraq possessed a stockpile of illicit weapons were to be true, then the UK and US would need to present credible evidence that Iraq had managed to stabilise its chemical and biological agents to a greater extent than it is previously thought to have done. The UK dossier does not make this claim, except as an unsubstantiated assertion that Iraq had "the knowledge and capability to add stabiliser to nerve agent and other chemical warfare agents which would prevent such decomposition." The fact that this assertion falls short of the claim that Iraq actually achieved the stabilisation of its chemical agents can be taken as an acknowledgement that no evidence has been discovered - after over 7 years of intrusive inspections and 11 years of intelligence gathering - to demonstrate Iraq's retention of stabilised chemical or biological agents.
CIA, October 2002, p.10: "UNSCOM discovered a document at Iraqi Air Force headquarters in July 1998 showing that Iraq overstated by at least 6,000 the number of chemical bombs it told the UN it had used during the Iran-Iraq War - bombs that remain are unaccounted for."
Secretary Powell, 5 February 2003: "If we consider just one category of missing weaponry -- 6,500 bombs from the Iran-Iraq war -- UNMOVIC says the amount of chemical agent in them would be in the order of 1,000 tons. These quantities of chemical weapons are now unaccounted for."
Iraq provided this 6-page document to UNMOVIC on 30 November 2002, as discussed in an article in The Times of 21 December. After reviewing it, Hans Blix, Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, in his notes for briefing the Security Council of 9 January 2003, stated:
"The so-called Air Force document, which was provided separately from the Declaration, relates to the consumption of chemical munitions in the Iraq/Iran war. It was hoped that the submission of this document would help verify material balances regarding special munitions. After having analysed the document, we have concluded that it will in fact not contribute to resolving this issue. There remains therefore, a significant discrepancy concerning the numbers of special munitions."
Dr Blix elaborated on these comments in his update to the Security Council on 27 January 2003:
"The document indicates that 13,000 chemical bombs were dropped by the Iraqi Air Force between 1983 and 1988, while Iraq has declared that 19,500 bombs were consumed during this period. Thus, there is a discrepancy of 6,500 bombs. The amount of chemical agent in these bombs would be in the order of about 1,000 tonnes. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we must assume that these quantities are now unaccounted for."
Dr Blix clarified his position in his briefing to the Security Council on 14 February 2003:
"To take an example, a document, which Iraq provided, suggested to us that some 1,000 tonnes of chemical agent were 'unaccounted for'. One must not jump to the conclusion that they exist."
UK dossier, 24 September 2002, p.16: "we assess that when the UN inspectors left Iraq they were unable to account for: up to 360 tonnes of bulk chemical warfare agent, including 1.5 tonnes of VX nerve agent"
State Department, 19 December 2002: "In 1999, UN Special Commission and international experts concluded that Iraq needed to provide additional, credible information about VX production. The [Iraqi] declaration provides no information to address these concerns. What is the Iraqi regime trying to hide by not providing this information?"
White House, January 2003, p.6: "In 1999, UN Special Commission and international experts concluded that Iraq needed to provide additional, credible information about VX production. UNSCOM concluded that Iraq had not accounted for 1.5 tons of VX, a powerful nerve agent. Former UNSCOM head Richard Butler wrote that “a missile warhead of the type Iraq has made and used can hold some 140 liters of VX [...]. A single such warhead would contain enough of the chemical to kill up to 1 million people.”"
Condoleezza Rice, "Why We Know Iraq is Lying", New York Times, 23 January 2003: "Iraq has also failed to provide United Nations inspectors with documentation of its claim to have destroyed its VX stockpiles."
Secretary Powell, 5 February 2003: "It took years for Iraq to finally admit that it had produced four tons of the deadly nerve agent, VX. [...] UNSCOM also gained forensic evidence that Iraq had produced VX and put it into weapons for delivery. Yet, to this day, Iraq denies it had ever weaponized VX. And on January 27, UNMOVIC told this council that it has information that conflicts with the Iraqi account of its VX program."
Evaluation. In 1998, UNSCOM found VX degradation products on missile warheads, indicating that Iraq had stabilised VX sufficiently and had managed to weaponise it (in contrast to the Government of Iraq's own claims). Two factors would indicate that the 1.5 tonnes of VX nerve agent no longer exist in operational form.
Firstly, Iraq claimed that this quantity of VX was discarded unilaterally by dumping it on the ground. VX degrades rapidly if placed onto concrete (see this report of 15 November 2002). In accordance with Iraq's claim, UNSCOM tested the site at which the VX was reportedly dumped. UNSCOM's January 1999 report states in Appendix II, paragraph 16:
"Traces of one VX-degradation product and a chemical known as a VX-stabilizer were found in the samples taken from the VX dump sites."
However, from this information alone, UNSCOM was not able to make "a quantified assessment"; that is, they were not able to verify that all 1.5 tonnes of the agent had been so destroyed.
Iraq provided further material from late February 2003 to substantiate its case, material that is currently being assessed.
Secondly, VX, even if stabilised, degrades. The IISS strategic dossier of September 2002 records the status of VX produced before the Gulf War: "Any VX produced by Iraq before 1991 is likely to have decomposed over the past decade [...]. Any G-agent or V-agent stocks that Iraq concealed from UNSCOM inspections are likely to have deteriorated by now." (pp. 52 and 53).
State Department, 12 September 2002, p.9: "Iraq has not [..] accounted for about 550 artillery shells filled with mustard agent." (repeated in CIA, October 2002, p.10).
State Department, 19 December 2002: "In January 1999, the UN Special Commission reported that Iraq failed to provide credible evidence that 550 mustard gas-filled artillery shells... had been lost or destroyed. [...] Again, what is the Iraqi regime trying to hide by not providing this information?" (partially repeated in White House, January 2003, p.6).
Secretary Powell, 5 February 2003: "Saddam Hussein has never accounted for vast amounts of chemical weaponry: 550 artillery shells with mustard [..]"
Evaluation. A "blister agent", mustard has a longer shelf-life than G-series nerve agents. As the final assessment report from UNSCOM recorded: "a dozen mustard-filled shells were recovered at a former CW storage facility in the period 1997 - 1998 [..]. After seven years, the purity of mustard ranged between 94 and 97%."
(Enclosure 1 to the Annex of the Letter to the President of the Security Council, 29 January 1999, S/1999/94, para.33; at: http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/s99-94.htm)
However, mustard has a high volume-to-effectiveness ratio. As the IISS record in the strategic dossier, at p.43:
"large amounts of mustard are necessary for effective military operations. Roughly, one tonne of agent is needed to effectively contaminate 2.6 square kilometres of territory, if properly disseminated."
Iraq declared that it filled approximately 13,000 artillery shells with mustard prior to 1991. UNSCOM accounted for 12,792 of these shells, and destroyed them in the period of 1992-94. However, Iraq also declared that 550 mustard-filled artillery shells had been lost in the aftermath of the Gulf War. The extent to which these - if they still existed - could constitute an ongoing danger should be assessed in light of the need to deploy large amounts of mustard for effective use.
Iraq has also cooperated in the destruction of remaining mustard items. 10 artillery shells were found by UNSCOM but were not destroyed before UNSCOM withdrew in 1998. As requested, Iraq kept these shells at al-Mutanna facility, where they were identified by UNMOVIC on 4 December 2002. On 11 February 2003, UNMOVIC reported:
"An UNMOVIC chemical team went to Al Mutanna, approximately 140 km north of Baghdad in preparation for the beginning of the process of destroying 10 155mm artillery shells and four plastic containers filled with mustard gas. The destruction process will begin tomorrow and is expected to last four to five days to complete. UNMOVIC chemical inspectors will work with an Iraqi team in the destruction process. These artillery shells were scheduled to be destroyed by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) in 1998 but the plan was halted when UNSCOM withdrew from Iraq."
Technical problems were subsequently reported, but destruction continued from 25 February 2003, and was completed by 5 March 2003.
(iv) G-agents (nerve agents)
Department of Defense, 8 October 2002: 200 metric tons of G-agents (sarin) are unaccounted for.
Evaluation. The main G-agents produced by Iraq were tabun, sarin and cyclosarin. These agents deteriorate rapidly, especially if impurities are present in their manufacture. This seems to have been the case with Iraq's nerve agents. The Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force of the US Department of Defense gave the following assessment in March 2001:
"Impure or improperly stored sarin is unstable and degrades over time. US experts consider chemical warfare agents less than 50 percent pure to be militarily ineffective. Western sources estimate the sarin Iraq produced never exceeded 60 percent purity, and Iraq reported that poor operating practices at Al Muthanna limited the purity of sarin to between 20 and 50 percent. Since it contained at least 40 percent impurities when manufactured, sarin produced at Al Muthanna had a short shelf life. The CIA estimates the chemical warfare agent in the rockets stored at Al Muthanna had deteriorated to approximately 18 percent purity by the time that Bunker 2 was destroyed, leaving about 1600 kilograms (1.6 metric tons) of viable sarin."
"The Gulf War Air Campaign - Possible Chemical Warfare Agent Release at Al Muthanna, February 8, 1991", 19 March 2001; at: http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/al_muth/al_muth_s02.htm
The taskforce of the Department of Defense attributed the high level of Iraqi cooperation in revealing the scale of its earlier chemical programme to the fact that the Iraqi government realised that the nerve agents it had produced were no longer viable:
"We believe Iraq was largely cooperative on its latest declarations because many of its residual munitions were of little use - other than bolstering the credibility of Iraq's declaration - because of chemical agent degradation and leakage problems."
"Chemical Warfare Agent Issues During the Persian Gulf War", Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force, April 2002; at: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/gulfwar/cwagents/cwpaper1.htm
A similar assessment was made by the CIA in a memorandum from January 1991:
"Iraq is not able to make good-quality chemical agents. Technical failures have reduced their purity and caused problems in storage and handling. This is a particular problem for the sarin- type nerve agents (GB and GF). These both contain hydrofluoricacid (HF), an impurity that attacks metal surfaces and catalyzes nerve agent decomposition. This leads to metal failure and leaks in the ammunition, increasing handling hazards. [...] Lower purity significantly limits shelf life and reduces toxic effects when the munition is employed. [...] The nerve agent should have already begun to deteriorate, and decomposition should make most of the nerve agent weapons unserviceable by the end of March 1991."
"Iraq: Potential for Chemical Weapon Use", 25 January 1991; at: http://www.fas.org/irp/gulf/cia/970825/970613_dim37_91d_txt_0001.html
This assessment is repeated in the IISS strategic dossier of 9 September 2002: "As a practical matter, any nerve agent from this period [pre-1991] would have deteriorated by now.." (p.51)
(b) Existing chemical precursors
State Department, 12 September 2002, p.9: "Iraq has not accounted for hundreds of tons of chemical precursors and tens of thousands of unfilled munitions, including Scud variant missile warheads."
UK dossier, 24 September 2002, p.16: "we assess that when the UN inspectors left Iraq they were unable to account for [...] up to 3,000 tonnes of precursor chemicals, including approximately 300 tonnes which, in the Iraqi chemical warfare programme, were unique to the production of VX".
UK dossier, 24 September 2002, p.18: "In mid-2001 the JIC assessed that Iraq retained some chemical [..] precursors, production equipment [..] from before the Gulf War. These stocks would enable Iraq to produce significant quantities of mustard gas within weeks and of nerve agent within months."
CIA, October 2002, p.10: "Iraq probably has concealed precursors, production equipment, documentation, and other items necessary for continuing its CW effort. Baghdad never supplied adequate evidence to support its claims that it destroyed all of its CW agents and munitions. Thousands of tons of chemical precursors and tens of thousands of unfilled munitions, including Scud- variant missile warheads, remain unaccounted for."
State Department, 19 December 2002: "The Iraqi regime has never adequately accounted for hundreds, possibly thousands, of tons of chemical precursors. Again, what is the Iraqi regime trying to hide by not providing this information?" (repeated in White House, January 2003, p.6).
President Bush, 28 January 2003: "Our intelligence officials estimate that Saddam Hussein had the materials to produce as much as 500 tons of sarin, mustard and VX nerve agent. In such quantities, these chemical agents could also kill untold thousands."
Secretary Powell, 5 February 2003: "Saddam Hussein has never accounted [...] enough precursors to increase his stockpile to as much as 500 tons of chemical agents."
Evaluation. Chemical precursors do have a significantly longer shelf-life than the agents themselves. UNSCOM did recognise that it was unable to account for the balance between the precursor chemicals that Iraq is known to have had in 1991, and those that were verifiably destroyed. The total declared by Iraq - either produced by Iraq or imported - amounted to some 20,150 tonnes. Of these, 14,500 tonnes were used for the production of chemical weapons or for producing other precursors (leaving a balance of 5,650 tonnes unused for this purpose). Iraq further declared that it had in January 1991 a total of 3,915 tonnes of precursors left from the original 20,150 tonnes, with the discrepancy of 1,735 tonnes lost as a result of unsuitable storage, leaks, spillages etc.
Out of the 3,915 tonnes that Iraq claimed it still had in January 1991, UNSCOM accounted for 2,850 tonnes. The remainder was declared by Iraq either as having been destroyed unilaterally (242 tonnes) or having been destroyed during the Gulf War (823 tonnes). Iraq includes in the first of those categories - unilateral destruction in mid-1991 - all precursor chemicals for VX.
UNSCOM's assessment for each relevant precursor chemical that Iraq held in January 1991 is in Appendix II, para.22 of its January 1999 report. For some precursor chemicals, UNSCOM was able to account for the entire quantity held by Iraq; but with a number of other chemicals (such as dimethylaminohydrochloride, for the production of tabun; thionylchloride, for the production of G-agents mustard and VX; MPF and Cyclohexanol for G-agents; P2S5, diisopropyl amine, chloroethanol and choline for VX), UNSCOM was able to verify that destruction of these chemicals had taken place, but was unable to verify the amount. To take the example of dimethylaminohydrochloride, Iraq claimed that it had 295 tonnes in January 1991; but that approximately 30 tonnes were destroyed in the Gulf War. UNSCOM noted that "Evidence of destruction was seen by UNSCOM", but that "Accounting was not possible due to the state of destruction". Separately, 272 tonnes were destroyed under UNSCOM supervision.
Given UNSCOM's inability to discern the quantities of materials destroyed in 1991, it is difficult to see how Iraq could ever verify that this material no longer exists, particularly the material destroyed when the buildings they were in were bombed. It is also difficult to see how the US has arrived at a figure of 500 tonnes of potential production from retained precursors, as this figure is not mentioned in any UNSCOM or UNMOVIC reports.
It is also unclear to what extent Iraq has, pace the State Department, provided an adequate account of what happened to other chemical precursors it held in 1991. According to Hans Blix, Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, in his notes for briefing the Security Council of 19 December 2002, in the Iraqi declaration of 7 December 2002:
"there are some sections of new material. In the chemical weapons field, Iraq has further explained its account of the material balance of precursors for chemical warfare agents."
As the declaration is not in the public realm, it is impossible to assess if Iraq has provided further evidence of its claim to have unilaterally destroyed in 1991 its remaining stocks of precursor chemicals.
State Department, 12 September 2002, p.9: "Iraq continues to rebuild and expand dual-use infrastructure that it could quickly divert to chemical weapons production, such as chlorine and phenol plants."
|
Many of the most detailed claims made about Iraq since 1998 have been related to the rebuilding of facilities that were formerly associated with chemical and biological weapons. It is noticeable that few of these claims are that a specific facility is currently being used for the production of chemical or biological warfare agents. Instead, the facilities are identified as being capable of producing such agents as well as civilian products, or that the material that is being produced could be used in the development of illicit weapons. Unless there is a reliable assessment that the production undertaken at these facilities is part of a chemical and biological warfare programme, the information presented in these claims cannot be taken as demonstrating that Iraq has recently produced illicit chemical and biological agents. |
(a) Fallujah II (100 km north-west of Baghdad), in al-Saqlawiyya area of al-Anbar province
UK dossier, 24 September 2002, p.20: "plants formerly associated with the chemical warfare programme have been rebuilt. These include the chlorine and phenol plant at Fallujah 2 near Habbaniyah. In addition to their civilian uses, chlorine and phenol are used for precursor chemicals which contribute to the production of chemical agents."
State Department, 12 September 2002, p.9: "Iraq is seeking to purchase chemical weapons agent precursors and applicable production equipment, and is making an effort to hide activities at the Fallujah plant, which was one of Iraq's chemical weapons production facilities before the Gulf War. At Fallujah and three other plants, Iraq now has chlorine production capacity far higher than any civilian need for water treatment, and the evidence indicates that some of its chlorine imports are being diverted for military purposes."
CIA, October 2002, pp.10-11: "Baghdad continues to rebuild and expand dual-use infrastructure that it could divert quickly to CW production. The best examples are the chlorine and phenol plants at the Fallujah II facility. Both chemicals have legitimate civilian uses but also are raw materials for the synthesis of precursor chemicals used to produce blister and nerve agents. Iraq has three other chlorine plants that have much higher capacity for civilian production; these plants and Iraqi imports are more than sufficient to meet Iraq's civilian needs for water treatment. Of the 15 million kg of chlorine imported under the UN Oil-for-Food Program since 1997, Baghdad used only 10 million kg and has 5 million kg in stock, suggesting that some domestically produced chlorine has been diverted to such proscribed activities as CW agent production.
Fallujah II was one of Iraq's principal CW precursor production facilities before the Gulf war. In the last two years the Iraqis have upgraded the facility and brought in new chemical reactor vessels and shipping containers with a large amount of production equipment. They have expanded chlorine output far beyond pre-Gulf war production levels - capabilities that can be diverted quickly to CW production. Iraq is seeking to purchase CW agent precursors and applicable production equipment and is trying to hide the activities of the Fallujah plant."
Secretary Powell, 5 February 2003: "Iraq has rebuilt key portions of the Tareq State Establishment. Tareq includes facilities designed specifically for Iraq’s chemical weapons program and employs key figures from past programs".
Evaluation. This site, which used to produce chemical weapons precursors, was bombed in the Gulf War, and its remaining stocks were removed and destroyed by UNSCOM. It was inactive in 1998. The claims that it now produces chlorine and phenol (ie carbolic acid), which could serve as precursors for the production of weapons, were not substantiated in UK and US reports. These chemicals could also be used as disinfectants and in water treatment, and so the production of these chemicals in themselves would not necessarily be evidence for a weapons programme.
Results of UN inspections. Fallujah II was inspected by UNMOVIC inspectors on 9 December 2002. In contrast to the extensive claims of the CIA and the State Department, UNMOVIC found that the chlorine plant was not even in use:
"Two separate chemical plants are in the factory area and their major activity is the production of phenol and chlorine. The chlorine plant is currently inoperative. The site contains a number of tagged dual-use items of equipment, which were all accounted for. All key buildings were inspected in addition to the chlorine and phenol plants. The objectives of the visit were successfully achieved."
Joint IAEA / UNMOVIC press statement, 9 December 2002 (emphasis added).
Further inspections by UNMOVIC chemical teams have taken place on 17 December 2002, 8 and 19 January 2003, and 2 March 2003. An aerial inspection took place on 31 January 2003. The report of the inspection on 17 January 2003 repeated the finding that "The chlorine plant is currently inoperative."
Fallujah II is also sometimes referred to Tareq State Establishment (or Tareq State Enterprise). Secretary Powell used this name for the facility, as listed above; he may have used the alternate name to make refutation of his claims harder.
(b) Ibn Sina, Tarmiyya (68km northwest of Baghdad)
UK dossier, 24 September 2002, p.20: "New chemical facilities have been built, some with illegal foreign assistance, and are probably fully operational or ready for production. These include the Ibn Sina Company at Tarmiyah, which is a chemical research centre. It undertakes research, development and production of chemicals previously imported but not now available and which are needed for Iraq's civil industry. The Director General of the research centre is Hikmat Na'im al-Jalu who prior to the Gulf War worked in Iraq's nuclear weapons programme and after the war was responsible for preserving Iraq's chemical expertise."
Evaluation. This is a reference to the Research Centre for Industrial Chemistry which was established in March 1992. According to IAEA reports from 1993 and 1994, the Centre was engaged in small scale chemical recovery work, such as the purification of phosphoric acid and the recovery of vanadium from coal ash.
Results of UN inspection. The IAEA continues to monitor the site. On 11 December 2002, after an IAEA inspection, a joint IAEA/UNMOVIC news update stated that the monitors "inspected the new activities at the site and verified that no nuclear activities remain or have been initiated." There were further inspections by an UNMOVIC chemical team on 4 January 2003 and by a missile team on 11 January 2003.
(c) al-Qa'qa' (60km southwest of Baghdad)
UK dossier, 24 September 2002, p.20: "Parts of the al-Qa'qa' chemical complex damaged in the Gulf War have also been repaired and are operational. Of particular concern are elements of the phosgene production plant at al-Qa'qa'. These were severely damaged during the Gulf War, and dismantled under UNSCOM supervision, but have since been rebuilt. While phosgene does have industrial uses it can also be used by itself as a chemical agent or as a precursor for nerve agent."
Evaluation. Iraqi officials claimed to journalists visiting the site after the release of the UK dossier that phosgene is produced as a by-product of the manufacture of gun-powder, the stated purpose of the plant.
Results of UN inspection. al-Qa'qa' site has been repeatedly inspected by the IAEA, in most detail from 9 - 10 and 15 December 2002. An UNMOVIC chemical team has also visited, most recently on 18 - 19/20 - 21 - 23 - 24 - 25 January 2003; a multidisciplinary UNMOVIC team visited on 2 February 2003.
(d) al-Musayyib (south of Baghdad)
Secretary Powell, 5 February 2003: "I'm going to show you a small part of a chemical complex called "Al Musayyib", a site that Iraq has used for at least three years to transship chemical weapons from production facilities out to the field. In May 2002, our satellites photographed the unusual activity in this picture. Here we see cargo vehicles are again at this transshipment point, and we can see that they are accompanied by a decontamination vehicle associated with biological or chemical weapons activity. What makes this picture significant is that we have a human source who has corroborated that movement of chemical weapons occurred at this site at that time. So it's not just the photo and it's not an individual seeing the photo. It's the photo and then the knowledge of an individual being brought together to make the case. This photograph of the site taken two months later, in July, shows not only the previous site which is the figure in the middle at the top with the bulldozer sign near it, it shows that this previous site, as well as all of the other sites around the site have been fully bulldozed and graded. The topsoil has been removed. The Iraqis literally removed the crust of the earth from large portions of this site in order to conceal chemical weapons evidence that would be there from years of chemical weapons activity."
Evaluation. It seems highly unlikely that residue of 3 years of chemical transshipment could be completely hidden simply by removing the topsoil. As Jonathan Ban of the Washington-based Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute said in response to the claims of Secretary Powell:
"I find it very difficult to believe that if there was chemical weapons contamination in the area that the Iraqis would be able to completely get rid of that contamination. The image shows that there are some areas of ground on the site that haven't been graded and I think the inspectors would be able to take samples from there to prove conclusively whether or not there has been recent chemical weapons activity".
Instead, detailed analysis of the facilities at al-Musayyib would be likely to yield physical evidence. This is what inspectors have been trying to find. A first visit to a pesticide store there was successfully completed on 13 December 2002. UNMOVIC reported on 11 February 2003:
"An UNMOVIC multidisciplinary team inspected the Al Musaayaib Ammo Depot, an ammunition storage area south of Baghdad on 10 February. The team inspected bunkers, warehouses, small buildings and storage areas."
Any evidence of chemical transshipment will be reported to the Security Council. No such evidence has been reported to date.
UK dossier, 24 September 2002, p.18: "The JIC concluded that Iraq had sufficient expertise, equipment and material to produce biological warfare agents within weeks using its legitimate bio-technology facilities."
UK dossier, 24 September 2002, p.21: "We know from intelligence that Iraq has continued to produce biological warfare agents. [..] UNSCOM only destroyed equipment that could be directly linked to biological weapons production. Iraq also has its own engineering capability to design and construct biological agent associated fermenters, centrifuges, sprayer dryers and other equipment and is judged to be self-sufficient in the technology required to produce biological weapons."
CIA, October 2002, p.2: "All key aspects - R&D, production, and weaponization - of Iraq's offensive BW program are active and most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf war."
CIA, October 2002, p.15: "The improvement or expansion of a number of nominally "civilian" facilities that were directly associated with biological weapons indicates that key aspects of Iraq's offensive BW program are active and most elements more advanced and larger than before the 1990-1991 Gulf war."
|
Evaluation. It is unclear how seriously the CIA's claim that Iraq's BW programme is more advanced now than it was in 1991 should be taken, especially as al-Hakam, Iraq's main biological weapons facility, had been destroyed under UNSCOM supervision in May-June 1996. The Security Council's Panel on Disarmament recorded in March 1999 that "the declared facilities of Iraq's BW programme have been destroyed and rendered harmless" (para.23). In any event, the CIA's claim is contradicted by other US official assessments. The US General Accounting Office (GAO), and investigative arm of the Congress, concluded in September 2002 that:
|
State Department, 12 September 2002, p.8, sourcing UNSCOM's final reports: "Iraq admitted to producing biological agents, and after the 1995 defection of a senior Iraqi official, Iraq admitted to the weaponization of thousands of liters of anthrax, botulinim toxin, and aflatoxin for use with Scud warheads, aerial bombs and aircraft. United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) experts concluded that Iraq's declarations on biological agents vastly understated the extent of its program, and that Iraq actually produced two to four times the amount of most agents, including anthrax and botulinim toxin, than it had declared."
State Department, 12 September 2002, p.8: "UNSCOM reported to the UN Security Council in April 1995 that Iraq had concealed its biological weapons program and had failed to account for 3 tons of growth material for biological agents."
UK dossier, 24 September 2002, p.19: "In particular, Iraq could not explain large discrepancies between the amount of growth media (nutrients required for the specialised growth of agent) it procured before 1991 and the amounts of agent it admits to having manufactured. The discrepancy is enough to produce more than three times the amount of anthrax allegedly manufactured."
CIA, October 2002, p.15: "Baghdad did not provide persuasive evidence to support its claims that it unilaterally destroyed its BW agents and munitions. Experts from UNSCOM assessed that Baghdad's declarations vastly understated the production of biological agents and estimated that Iraq actually produced two-to-four times the amount of agent that it acknowledged producing, including Bacillus anthracis - the causative agent of anthrax - and botulinum toxin."
President Bush, 7 October 2002: "In 1995, after several years of deceit by the Iraqi regime, the head of Iraq's military industries defected. It was then that the regime was forced to admit that it had produced more than 30,000 liters of anthrax and other deadly biological agents. The inspectors, however, concluded that Iraq had likely produced two to four times that amount. This is a massive stockpile of biological weapons that has never been accounted for, and capable of killing millions."
State Department, 19 December 2002: "The UN Special Commission concluded that Iraq did not verifiably account for, at a minimum, 2160kg of growth media." (repeated by White House, January 2003, p.5).
White House Press Briefing by Press Secretary Ari Fleischer, 15 January 2003: "The [Iraqi] regime [was] forced to admit that it produced more than 30,000 liters of anthrax and other deadly biological agents. The inspectors concluded that Iraq likely produced two to four times that amount. That's a massive stockpile, and it's never been accounted for and it's capable of killing millions. It remains unaccounted for."
Secretary Powell, 26 January 2003: "Where is the evidence -- where is the evidence -- that Iraq has destroyed the tens of thousands of liters of anthrax and botulinum we know it had before it expelled the previous inspectors? [...] We're talking about the most deadly things one can imagine, that can kill thousands, millions of people."
Secretary Powell, 26 January 2003: "What happened -- please, what happened -- to the three metric tons of growth material that Iraq imported which can be used for producing early, in a very rapid fashion, deadly biological agents?"
Evaluation. One key problem in many of the above claims is that there is a confusion between what Iraq could have produced before 1991, and what it actually did produce. Iraq could have produced considerably more biological agents than it declared if all of Iraq's claims to have lost, damaged and destroyed growth media were untrue, and furthermore if its claim that its fermentors (turning the growth media into weaponisable agents) were not used for certain periods of time was also untrue. Taking the maximal position that Iraq could have fully utilised all imported growth media, without any failed batches, and engaged its fermentors in maximal production continuously, UNSCOM states in its January 1999 report that Iraq could have produced three times as many anthrax spores, sixteen times as much Clostridium perfringens and 6% more botulinum toxin than it had declared. These are very large assumptions to make in assessing Iraq's production levels.
The quotes above from the State Department and CIA in September and October 2002, misrepresent the findings of UNSCOM most clearly: UNSCOM did not conclude with the State Department "that Iraq actually produced two to four times the amount of most agents, including anthrax and botulinim toxin, than it had declared", but that if the assumptions above were to hold, the "[q]uantities produced could be at least 3 times greater than stated" by Iraq (in its January 1999 report, Appendix III). To infer from this to what Iraq "actually produced" (State Department) is to make a leap of logic for which there is insufficient evidence. Similarly, President Bush and Press Secretary Fleischer both impute views to UNSCOM that never constituted the position of the inspectorate: in no UNSCOM report is it stated that Iraq is "likely" to have produced more than it claimed, but merely that it could have done so.
Furthermore, the claims about Iraq possessing a stockpile of biological weapons created before 1991 may suffer from the same problems as discussed for the notion of a stockpile of chemical weapons, above. The assessment by Professor Anthony H. Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is as follows:
"The shelf-life and lethality of Iraq's weapons is unknown, but it seems likely that the shelf-life was limited. In balance, it seems probable that any agents Iraq retained after the Gulf War now have very limited lethality, if any"
"Iraq's Past and Future Biological Weapons Capabilities" (1998), p.13, at: http://www.csis.org/stratassessment/reports/iraq_bios.pdf
It is particularly curious that Dr Blix, in his update to the Security Council on 27 January 2003, provides a wholly different set of figures from the US in accounting for growth media. He claims that 650kg of bacterial growth media is unaccounted for (unlike the US claims that 2160kg or, alternatively, 3 tonnes of this media is unaccounted for).
In addition to these confusions over the quantity of growth media that are unaccounted for, there is also the issue of whether any growth media held by Iraq in 1991 could still be still used for the production of biological weapons. UNSCOM (January 1999 report, Appendix III) state with regard to the growth media for botulinum toxin, anthrax and perfringens:
"Although the expiry date for this media would have passed, advice from the manufacturers is that given appropriate storage conditions, particularly away from moisture, the media would still be usable today. The Commission has no information regarding its fate, whether it was retained or used to produce additional undeclared BW agent."
Inspections. Iraq has attempted to demonstrate its claims about the destruction of biological agents in 1991 by excavating a site at which the agents were allegedly destroyed. On 25 February 2003, UNMOVIC reported as follows:
"UNMOVIC has received several letters from the Government of Iraq over the last few days. These letters relate to [...] excavations of a dumpsite for the destroyed aerial bombs filled with biological agents, and an additional explanation on a biological agent. UNMOVIC was invited to participate in the excavations and verification of the aerial bombs filled with biological agents, which Iraq claims had been unilaterally destroyed in the Al Aziziya Range in the summer of 1991. Iraq began excavations of the site on 19 February. An UNMOVIC biological team visited this dumpsite yesterday and today. This site is located approximately 100km southwest of Baghdad. The team inspected munitions fragments and observed excavation of a pit where, Iraq claims, munitions had previously been explosively destroyed."
The continued excavations at Al Azaziya are discussed below, with regard to the allegations about the delivery of chemical and biological weapons.
Secretary Powell, 5 February 2003: "By 1998, U.N. experts agreed that the Iraqis had perfected drying techniques for their biological weapons programs."
Evaluation. This seems to be untrue. UNSCOM never stated in its official reports that Iraq had "perfected drying techniques". UNSCOM recognised that Iraq had experimented with drying techniques, but seem to have been unsure about Iraq's success in this regard. In its January 1999 report, Appendix III, UNSCOM report:
"Iraq cites the production of ~50 litres of Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) spores in March 1990 for drying studies which are claimed not to have been done because of a failure to obtain a particular spray dryer. However, Bt spores were taken by Iraq to the supplier in December 1989 to test on the spray dryer it planned to acquire. The quantity of Bt spores produced can not be verified."
(ii) Anthrax spores and yeast extract
UK dossier, 24 September 2002, p.16: "we assess that when the UN inspectors left Iraq they were unable to account for [...] growth media procured for biological agent production (enough to produce over three times the 8,500 litres of anthrax spores Iraq admits to having manufactured)"
Department of Defense, 8 October 2002, slide 24: 3 to 4 times more anthrax .. was produced than are unaccounted for.
Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Washington, 19 December 2002: "Before the inspectors were forced to leave Iraq, they concluded that Iraq could have produced 26,000 liters of anthrax. That is three times the amount Iraq had declared. Yet, the Iraqi declaration is silent on this stockpile, which, alone, would be enough to kill several million people."
State Department, 19 December 2002: "The UN Special Commission concluded that Iraq did not verifiably account for, at a minimum, 2160kg of growth media. This is enough to produce 26,000 liters of anthrax -- 3 times the amount Iraq declared" (repeated by White House, January 2003, p.5).
President Bush, 28 January 2003: "The United Nations concluded in 1999 that Saddam Hussein had biological weapons sufficient to produce over 25,000 liters of anthrax -- enough doses to kill several million people."
Secretary Powell, 5 February 2003: "Iraq declared 8,500 liters of anthrax, but UNSCOM estimates that Saddam Hussein could have produced 25,000 liters. If concentrated into this dry form, this amount would be enough to fill tens upon tens upon tens of thousands of teaspoons. And Saddam Hussein has not verifiably accounted for even one teaspoon-full of this deadly material."
Evaluation.
(1) Production before 1991
In his update to the Security Council on 27 January 2003, Dr Blix stated:
"There are strong indications that Iraq produced more anthrax than it declared, and that at least some of this was retained after the declared destruction date. It might still exist."
The "strong evidence" seems to be a reference to the possibility that Iraq used its fermentors at a greater capacity than it has declared previously: this is the only explanation provided by UNSCOM for the possibility of a greater volume of anthrax spores being produced by Iraq than it has declared. In its January 1999 report to the Security Council (Appendix III), UNSCOM details how Iraq produced anthrax spores on an industrial scale from September 1990 until a few weeks before the start of the Gulf War in January 1991. The volume of the fermentors in use at al-Hakam (where Iraq's anthrax was produced) is described in this UNSCOM report:
"According to a document provided by Iraq two such fermentors were planned to produce Agent A (botulinum toxin) and one for Agent B (Bacillus anthracis spores). This is described as industrial scale production and implicit is that it satisfied the minimum military requirement for Iraq. [...] In the event the fermentation line from the Al-Kindi Company was installed comprising seven 1480 litre fermentors and two 1850 litre fermentors (i.e., a total of 14060 litres) which is a similar overall volume confirming the operational scale requirement. Operating at a 5-day cycle about 820,000 litres of agent could be produced per year equivalent to 82000 litres of 10-fold concentrated agent. Assuming an annual replenishment of agent it would appear the initial annual capacity of the factory would be about 80,000 litres."
Iraq claimed that it produced 8445 litres of anthrax spores, material which UNSCOM had some evidence that Iraq destroyed:
"There are various accounts derived from both [Iraq's declaration to UNSCOM] and independent Iraqi testimony concerning the destruction of bulk Agent B [ie, Bacillus anthracis spores]. Laboratory analy